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Credit Opportunities, Race, and

Presumptions: Does the McDonnell Douglas
Framework Apply in Fair Lending Cases?
Latimore v. CitibankFederalSavings Bank'
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has recognized that "[i]n a credit oriented society such as ours,
impediments to sources of credit based on extraneous factors such as race, color,
religion, age, sex, marital status, and the like, have a deleterious effect on both
the individual victims of discrimination, and on the economy as a whole."2
Minority borrowers feel the impact of credit discrimination. "They make me feel
like I was wasting my time. Like I wasn't worthy of being a home owner."3
Lenders often do not realize what they have done. "The discrimination in
mortgage lending with which I've become familiar is not necessarily malicious
or abusive. Indeed, in many cases, it's often unconscious. It, nevertheless, has
been found to exist and is generally embodied in some sort of unfounded
reluctance to engage in mortgage lending in certain neighborhoods."
Credit is the access code to mobility, but what happens when an
individual's access is denied? Congress has enacted several statutes to deal with
this problem, but case law is not clear on how to prove a credit discrimination
case. This Note will explore three options to prove a prima facie credit
discrimination case. To reach that end, this Note will briefly explore legislative
acts to pre'vent credit discrimination and why Congress enacted them, the

McDonnell Douglasframework for discrimination cases, and other methods to
prove discrimination in mortgage lending. Finally, this Note will examine the
current circuit split and offer proposed solutions to this disagreement.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Helen Latimore, a resident of a predominantly African-American, south
side Chicago neighborhood, needed a loan.5 Using the home she owned as

1. 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1998).
2. Amendment ofthe Equal Credit OpportunityAct andthe Truth in Lending Act:
Hearingson S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S. 1961 and H.R. 5616 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking,Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.
(1975) (testimony of J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice).
3. Bernard Parker, Co-Chair, Ad Hoc Coalition of Fair Banking Practices in
Detroit, 1989 Hearing,at 140 (quoting a rejected loan applicant).
4. S.REP. No. 101-461 (1990), available in 1990 WL 201711, at *10.
5. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713.
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collateral, she asked Citibank for fifty-one thousand dollars.6 While she satisfied
Citibank's creditworthiness standards, she fell short of the bank's required
seventy-five percent security-to-loan ratio.'
Dissatisfied with the bank's forty-five thousand dollar appraisal of her
home, Latimore offered an earlier appraisal valuing the property at eighty-two
thousand dollars, which the account executive, Lundberg, forwarded to the
bank's appraisal review department.8 The appraisal review department would
not accept the eighty-two thousand dollar appraisal because the comparable
sales, in its view, were not comparable.9 After failing this review, Citibank
denied Latimore the loan.' 0
Latimore then received the loan she needed from a second bank. This bank
granted the loan on a lower principal and higher interest rate based on a seventynine thousand dollar appraisal."
Naming Citibank and two of its employees as defendants, Helen Latimore
filed a credit discrimination suit and requested damages under "an assortment of
federal civil rights laws," but primarily under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) and the Fair Housing Act (FHA). 12 At the district court level, Citibank

6. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1998).
7. See id. Citibank requires that the loan amount not exceed 75% of the collateral's
value, in this case the value of the plaintiff's house. Id. Citibank defines the ratio on
their web page as follows: "An LTV, or Loan-to-Value, is a ratio of the amount of the
mortgage to the value of the home. For example, if your home is worth $100,000 and
your mortgage is $80,000, your loan-to-value ratio is 80% (your loan is 80% of the value
of

your

home)."

CitiBank,

Frequently

Asked

Questions

<http//www.citibank.com/mortgage/faq.htm>.
8. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713. Mr. Kembauer's, the bank's appraiser and a
named defendant in the suit, appraisal produced "a loan-to-value ratio of 113 percent."
Id.
9. See id. The department declined the appraisal because the comparable properties
were more than six blocks from the plaintiff's. See id.
10. See id.

11. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1998).
The second bank loaned the plaintiff $46,000 at "one percent higher interest." Id.
12. Id. The two employees named in the action were Marcia Lunberg, the account
executive, and Ed Kembauer, the appraiser. The damages included additional interest
and "certain consequential damages." Id.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(1994), provides: "It
shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to
any aspect of a credit transaction- (1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract)
."

15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1994).
The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994), provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against
any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or
conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/6
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successfully moved for summary judgment. 3 In her appeal to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, Latimore questioned the quantity of evidence required
for a plaintiffs prima facie credit discrimination case to weather summary
judgment. 4 Latimore argued that she was entitled to use the McDonnell
Douglas'5 presumption of discrimination.16 She argued that to shift the burden
to Citibank, she only needed to show "that her house was in a minority
neighborhood, [that] an appraisal estimated the value of the house to be at least
as great as the loan, [that she] was creditworthy, [and that]... the loan was
rejected."' 7
In an unrelated argument, Latimore alleged that white borrowers received
preferential treatment at the hands of Lundberg and Citibank. 8 Specifically,
when similarly situated white borrowers-those who desired like amounts and
possessed property equivalent in value-fell short on appraisals, Lundberg
would encourage those prospective borrowers to provide more "comparables"
to the bank's appraiser.' 9
Citibank also offered McDonnell Douglas as the standard in credit

discrimination cases.2"

In a self-serving proposal, Citibank argued that

Latimore's showing must include creditworthiness and satisfactory collateral
value under the bank's measure.2' While Latimore was creditworthy, she could
not meet the appraisal standard.22
Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Latimore, Judge
Richard Posner, writing for the panel, concluded that "no reasonable jury could
find that she, Latimore, was turned down because of her race," and affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Citibank. 3 In its
affirmation, the court held that the McDonnell Douglasframework is unsuitable

handicap, familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3605(2) (1994). "[T]he term 'residential real estate-related transaction'
means any of the following: (1) The making or purchasing of loans or providing other
financial assistance- (A) for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or
maintaining a dwelling; or (B) secured by residential real estate. (2) The selling,
brokering, or appraising of residential real property." 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(l)-(2) (1994).
13. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713.
14. See id.
15. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
16. See id. at 713-14. For a discussion of the discrimination test in McDonnell
Douglas,see infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
17. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998).
18. See id.
19. Id. at 715-16.
20. See id. at 713.
21. See id. at 714.
22. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1998).
23. Id. at716.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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for credit discrimination cases because no basis exists to compare the plaintiff's
treatment with the "defendant's treatment of other, similarly situated persons."24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. DiscriminationStatistics andForms
A brief look at lending statistics proves helpful in uncovering the pressing
need for government action to prevent lending discrimination. Bill Dedman, a
staff writer for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, studied savings-and-loan (S&L)
statistics from 1983 to 1988.' Three-thousand one hundred S&Ls accepted ten
million loan applications over the five year period, which resulted in fifty percent
of all home loans in the United States.26 The results of this survey produced
some disturbing statistics. The study showed that African-Americans received
loans half as often as whites.27 In addition to the disproportionate rejection rate,
African-Americans withdrew "applications 21 percent more often and receive[d]
no decision on loan applications 23 percent more often." ' Summing up the
statistics, the study showed that African-Americans received loans fifty percent
of the time, as opposed to sixty-five percent for whites.29
By race, the national statistics for rejections are alarming: rejection rates
for whites, 11.1%; Asians, 12.2%; American Indians, 16.5%; Iispanics, 18.2%;
and African-Americans, 23.7%.3" African-Americans in the Midwest and plains
states enjoy the highest incomes relative to whites in the nation, but S&Ls
rejected them for home loans at a greater rate than anywhere in the nation
(Plains: white, 12.6%; African-American, 30.9%. Midwest: white, 12.2%;
African-American, 29.6%). 31
Looking at these statistics, one could assume that the higher rejection rates
were simply a function of income, but the study showed contrary data. In
eighty-five out of one hundred of the largest metropolitan areas surveyed, low
income whites received loans more often than high income blacks in one of the
five years during the study.32 In three of the 33
five years, thirty-five of one
hundred metropolitan areas produced this result.

24. Id. at 714.
25. Bill Dedman, Blacks Turned Down for Home Loans From S&Ls Twice as
Often as Whites, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 22, 1989, at A01.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id.

30.
31.
32.
33.

See id
See id.
See id.
See id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/6
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Discrimination does not begin when a potential borrower hands over his
loan application. Rather, discriminatory practices begin when lenders market
their services. Lenders may "fail[] to provide ... different information or
services regarding... aspect[s] of the lending process., 34 Alternatively, lenders
may "discourage[] or selectively encouragef applicants with respect... [to]
'
applications for credit."35
The United States brought its first ECOA/FHA action for credit
discrimination against Decatur Federal Savings & Loan Association.36 Alleging
a "policy or practice" of discrimination, the government entered into a consent
decree with Decatur for its "practice of marketing services
and products almost
37
exclusively to white residents of the Atlanta area."
Notwithstanding ECOA and FHA, lenders continued to discriminate based
on race due to "segregated housing patterns and the deterioration of urban ghetto
neighborhoods."3' Redlining placed the decision to make a loan not on the
"creditworthiness of the individual applicant or the soundness of the [collateral],
but on the... subjectivejudgment... of the lender that the neighborhood may
'
be declining."39
In Unites States v. Blackpipe State Bank," the United States brought an
action against a bank for denying loans where the collateral was located on
Indian reservations, for requiring greater collateral for "Native Americans than
similarly situated white applicants, and [for] denial of applications when
similarly situated whites were approved."41 The bank entered into a consent
decree to remedy the discriminatory practices.42
By "refusing to extend credit or [use] different standards in determining
whether to extend credit," lenders' discrimination is evident through a
differential in denial rates.43 These differentials often manifest themselves
through subjective criteria for application evaluation." For example, in United
States v. Shawmut Mortgage Co.,45 the Justice Department alleged that

34. Robert G. Schwemm, A FairLending Symposium: Litigatinga Mortgage
Lending Case,Introduction to MortgageLending DiscriminationLaw, 28 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 317, 327 (1995).
35. Id.
36. See Kathleen E. Keest, ResidentialMortgage Litigation: CreditDiscrimination,
989 PLI/CoRP. 569, 596 (1997) (citing United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
Civ. No. 1:92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. 1992)).
37. Id. at 596-97.
38. DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW 3-23 (1990).
39. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-562, at 12 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313).
40. Civ. No. 93-5115 (D.S.D. 1994), cited in Keest, supra note 36, at 597.
41. Keest, supra note 36, at 597.
42. See Keest, supra note 36, at 598.
43. Schwemm, supra note 34, at 327.
44. See Keest, supra note 36, at 598.
45. Civ. No. 3:93-CV-2453 (avc) (D. Conn. 1993), Clearinghouse No. 49,953A
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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underwriters and loan officers held far too much discretion in their ability to
accept supplemental data when considering a marginal loan.46 This discretion,
combined with Shawmut's denial statistics, indicated some level of
discrimination against African-American and Hispanic applicants. 7
Assigning different interest rates, costs, and loan terms based on protected
status also qualifies as discriminatory lending. 48 For example, the First National
Bank of Vicksburg faced Justice Department charges of assessing a four to
eleven percent higher interest rate for African-American home improvement
borrowers as compared to similarly situated white borrowers. 49
Even though discrimination begins before the loan is processed, it may
continue after the loan is made. If a lender applies different standards based on
a protected status when "servicing... or invoking default remedies," the lender
violates provisions of ECOA and FHA.50 An example of this practice might
include differentials in a lender's default declaration practices or in allowing
5
opportunities to cure defaults based on race or other status. '
B. Statutes andFrameworks
Congress introduced the Fair Housing Act (FHA) in 1968.52 Responding
to urban riots in 1967 and perceived housing discrimination problems, Congress
prohibited discrimination in "residential real estate-related transactions" because
53
of "race, color, religion, sex, handicap, family status, or national origin.,
While the FHA was expected to be a strong performer, the early years fell short
of expectations and did not quickly result in a strong body of lending
discrimination cases.5
'Within a decade, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) which banned "discrimination in all types of credit transactions. 55 In
1976, Congress amended this Act to include race along with its previous
restrictions against sex and marital status discrimination.56 During the 1976
amendment process, Congress directly addressed the burden of proof issue in

(complaint), 49,953B (consent decree).
46. See Keest, supra note 36, at 598.
47. See Keest, supra note 36, at 598.
48. See Keest, supra note 36, at 599; Schwemm, supra note 34, at 326.

49. See Keest, supranote 36, at 599 (citing United States v. First Nat'l Bank, Civ.
No. 5:94-CV- 6(b)(n) (S.D. Miss. 1994), Clearinghouse No. 49,954A (complaint)
49,954B (consent decree).
50. Schwemm, supra note 34, at 327.
51. See Schwemm, supra note 34, at 326.

52.
53.
54.
55.

See Schwemm, supra note 34, at 317.
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), (b) (1994).
See Schwemm, supra note 34, at 318.
Schwemm, supra note 34, at 318.
56. See Schwemm, supra note 34, at 318.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/6

6

1999]

Hill: Hill: Credit Opportunities, Race, and Presumptions:
CREDITDISCRIM1NA TION

cases of discriminatory lending practices with disparate effects.5 7 The Senate
Report states that "judicial constructions of anti-discrimination legislation in the
employment field, in cases such as Griggs v. Duke PowerCo. 58 and Albemarle
PaperCo. v. Moody,59 are intended to serve as guides in the application of this
act."'6 Unfortunately, the evidentiary standard for disparate treatment cases set
forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green61 is notably absent in this legislation.
Ample writings on and citations to McDonnellDouglas do, however, exist. This
section vill briefly describe the framework of this standard and its development
over the past twenty-five years. Under the framework, the plaintiff holds the
initial burden in a Title VII discrimination complaint.62 To carry this burden, the
plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complaintant's qualifications."
If the plaintiff's burden is met, the burden then shifts to "the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
light, 65 the
While the employer's burden is "exceedingly
rejection."'
66
representation must be "clear and reasonably specific."
If the employer presents a convincing argument to answer the plaintiff's
allegations, the presumption then disappears and the plaintiffmust show that the
"proffered reasons are pretextual and that the employment decision was the
result of discriminatory intent." 67 While the Supreme Court is quite clear that
intentional discrimination is the "ultimate issue," if a defendant's rationale fails
to convince the fact finder that a legitimate business practice excluded the

57. See H.R 6516, 94th Cong. (1975).
58. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs lays out the evidentiary standard for disparate
effects cases. See id. at 802-05.
59. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
60. S.R. No. 94-589, at 4 (1976) (citations omitted). Congress codified the Griggs
holding in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (1994).
61. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
62. See id.
63. Id. The Court noted that variations in Title VII fact patterns may alter the
specific facts required for a prima facie case under this test. See id. at 802 n.13.
64. Id. at 802.
65. Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 1994).
66. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
67. Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F. Supp. 1191,1205 (N.D. Iowa 1994)
(citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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plaintiff, the jury may infer a discriminatory intent when coupled with the
plaintiff's prima facie showing.6
Although the McDonnell Douglas framework "remains governing law,"
many courts either short circuit or evade several of its requirements when
deciding Title VII cases.69 In Lapsley v. Columbia University,0 Judge Chin
focused on the ultimate issue and strongly criticized the framework as a "yo-yo
rule, befuddl[ing], replete with confusion, and incomprehensible."' Noting its
general usefulness at its inception, Judge Chin contended that the framework's
usefulness had eroded over time and continued to do so as the test was further
clarified. Judge Chin observed that courts regularly gloss over the first two
stages of the test and "then proceed to disregard it, or at least radically simplify
it."His research showed that many courts assume arguendosatisfaction of the
first two prongs, attending only to prong three or simply "presum[ing] a prima
facie case has been established."74
Judge Chin encouraged wholesale discarding of the framework, as it had
"outlived its usefulness," and recommended a two-part "ultimate issue" test.75

68. See id.

69. See Lapsley v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 999 F.
Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
70. 999 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
71. Id. at 513 (quoting Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 992 F. Supp. 372, 373
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("yo-yo rule"); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, BurdenShifingApproachin Employment DiscriminationCases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703, 707-08
(1995) ("befuddling"); Shifting Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1602 (1996) ("replete with confusion"); Mullen v.

Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988)
("incomprehensible"); Hagelthom v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 1983);
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) ("incomprehensible"). Judge
Chin handed down Shafrirv. Association of Reform Zionists ofAmerica, 998 F. Supp.

355 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), on the same day airing the same criticisms of the framework.
72. See Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514 (citing Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d
1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998)); see also Quaratino v.
Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring only minute demonstration
under McDonnell's first prong).
73. Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 515.
74. Id. (citing Piraino v. International Orientation Resources, Inc., 137 F.3d 987,
990 n.1 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he district court short-circuited the McDonnell Douglas
analysis by assuming that [plaintiff] had established a prima facie case and that
[defendant] had articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken."); Jalal v.
Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (declining to "dance

mechanistically through the McDonnell-Douglas and Price Waterhouse 'minuets"');

Padob v. Entex Info. Serv., 960 F. Supp. 806, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). For cases on
presumptions, see Bikerstaff 992 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Jugueta v. Perry, No.
95 Civ. 10303, 1997 WL 742535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1997).
75. Lapsley v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 999 F. Supp.
506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/6
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First, he would require the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence. 76 Second, he would only require a plaintiff to
motives drove adverse
show that it was more likely than not that illicit
' 77
employment decisions where "proof [was] elusive. "
To decide both Lapsley and its sister case,7' Judge Chin deferred to the
current rule of law and applied the McDonnell Douglas test.79 He effectively
glossed over the framework's first two prongs and then proceeded directly to the
third prong-the ultimate issue.80
A number of courts have declined to extend the McDonnell Douglas
framework into new or expanding areas of the law. In most instances, the courts
find either statutorily directed evidentiary standards or a general inapplicability
of the fiamework to the controversy at bar. In Jordany. Clay's Rest Home,8' the
Virginia Supreme Court refused to extend the McDonnell Douglas framework
to wrongful discharge claims founded in workers' compensation retaliation or
race discrimination. 2 The plaintiff sought redress for wrongful discharge
"because of her race in violation of the public policy of Virginia ... prohibiting
race discrimination in employment."' Following the presentation of "plaintiff's
case-in-chief, the trial court [struck down] the evidence [on] both counts and
entered summary judgment for the defendant."'
On appeal, the plaintiff in Jordancontended that the "fundamental issue"
in the case was whether a minority plaintiff lacking direct evidence of wrongful
discharge could prove a claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
framework. 5 Citing federal and state cases, the plaintiff sought to extend the
framework to both statutory and common law wrongful discharge cases.86 After
reviewing McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, the court discussed the
appellant's proposed modification to the McDonnell Douglasframework.87 The
plaintiff alleged that a
"plaintiff may establish a prima facie case sufficient to shift the burden
of production to the defendant" if the plaintiff establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) that "the plaintiff was black"; (2)

76. See id. at 515-16.
77. Id. at 516.
78. Shafrir v. Association of Reform Zionists of America, 998 F. Supp. 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
79. See Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 516.
80. See Shafrir,998 F. Supp. at 361.
81. 483 S.E.2d 203 (Va. 1997).
82. See id. at 207.
83. Id. at 204.
84. Id.
85. Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home, 483 S.E.2d 203, 205 (Va. 1997).
86. See id. at 205-06.
87. See id. at 206.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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that "the defendant discharged the plaintiff from employment"; (3) that
"the plaintiff was satisfactorily performing the job," that is, she "was
qualified for the job"; and (4) that "the plaintiff was replaced with a
white employee."88
After noting Virginia's "strong commitment to the employment-at-will doctrine"
and finding its evidentiary and procedural structures for developing a prima facie
wrongful discharge case appropriate, the court rejected the "plaintiff's invitation
to adopt" the framework. 9
In support of its holding, the court could find no congressional or judicial
reference to the employment-at-will doctrine in either Title VII or the line of
Supreme Court cases extending the McDonnellDouglas test.' Further, the court
could determine no need for a special burden-shifting rule when plaintiffs are
allowed to prove wrongful discharge cases through circumstantial evidence.9'
In sum, the court in Jordan could not find a good reason to extend the
framework to the contested area of the law.
In a decision regarding the FHA, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin declined to extend the McDonnell Douglas
framework to the zoning context. In LauerFarms,Inc. v. Waushara County
Board of Adjustment,92 local pickle farmers brought an action seeking relief
under the FHA,93 other federal civil rights laws,94 and the Wisconsin Open
Housing Act.95 Seeking to purchase property for building migrant worker
camps, the farmers alleged that the Board of Adjustment ("the Board") reached
its decision not to grant a conditional use permit "bas[ed]... on discriminatory
reasons." 96 More specifically, the farmers charged that during the first board
meeting they heard no objections to their proposal. 97 During subsequent
meetings, however, townspeople made "discriminatory remarks and
'inappropriate references to the ethnicity, race, socioeconomic and family status,
and the income sources of the expected tenants."' 98 After the aforementioned
use permit denial, the farmers lost the opportunity to purchase the property.99

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 207.
Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home, 483 S.E.2d 203, 207 (Va. 1997).
See id.

92. 986 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1997).

93. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 (1994).
95. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 106.04 (West 1991) (similar in purpose to the FHA, but
additionally prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, disability, lawful
source of income, age, and ancestry). See Lauer Farms,986 F. Supp. at 546-47.
96. LauerFarms,986 F. Supp. at 546.
97. See Lauer Farms v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 544,
546 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
98. Id.
99. See id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/6
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The Board entered a broad motion for summary judgment on the issues of
standing and failure to allege facts sufficient to support a racial discrimination
claim under the sundry federal and state acts." After dismissing plaintiffs'
claims under the civil rights statutes for lack of standing, the court examined the
plaintiffs' prima facie case under the FHA.''
Attempting to force the plaintiffs into the McDonnellDouglasframework,
the Board relied heavily on Gamble v. City of Escondido,'0 2 which set out
elements for a prima facie case of discrimination due to denial of a conditional
use permit by a government actor. 3 The court conducted an analysis of this test
under the McDonnell Douglas rubric and found that the framework's primary
use was where no discriminatory intent was evident, which was the case in
Gamble and McDonnellDouglas. " Examining Seventh Circuit precedent, the
court found that the burden-shifting framework is appropriate where no "direct
proof of discrimination" exists.'05 Noting the other methods for proving a prima
facie discrimination case, the court held that where the plaintiffs have alternative
evidence, "reliance on the McDonnell Douglasanalysis is not necessary."'O° The
'court refused0 7to grant the Board's summary judgment motion with respect to the
FHA claim.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, in an
extremely comprehensive decision in Rouse v. Farmers State Bank,'08 also
declined to extend the framework into the whistleblower protection arena. The
controversy stemmed from allegations that the defendant bank terminated the
plaintiff, violating the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA).' 9 The plaintiff also claimed he was fired because of his
age and that his discharge violated other common law employer-employee
principles."'

100. See id. at 550.
101. See id. at 550-54.
102. 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir.1997).

103. See id. at 304
104. See id. at 556-57.
105. Id. at 557 (citing Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 1995) (age
discrimination); Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 1994) (age discrimination);
Castleman v. Acme Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1992) (age discrimination).
106. Lauer Farms v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 544, 557
(E.D. Wis. 1997).
107. See id.
108. 866 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (1994). See Rouse, 866 F. Supp. at 1197. FIRREA
protects FDIC insured institution's employee's from "discharge or other[] discrimination

...
with respect to compensation, terms conditions, or privileges of employment because
the employee.., provided information to any Federal Banking agency or the Attorney

General regarding" violations of laws or regulations, or the gross mismanagement or
waste of funds. 12 U.S.C. § 1837j (1994).
110. See Rouse, 866 F. Supp. at 1197
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Addressing the burden of proof for establishing the bank's liability under
FIRREA, the court engaged in an extensive review of the Eighth Circuit's
standard for prima facie showings in employment retaliation disputes."' A
summary of the Eighth Circuit's procedure is found in Gaworski v. 177
CommercialFinancialCorp.," which "modifi[ed] ...
the so-called McDonnell
Douglas factors" to establish a prima facie case for "adverse employment
decisions."', 13 After a long and thoughtful discussion of the McDonnellDouglas
framework and FIRREA, the court concluded that a two-prong analysis was
appropriate in whistleblower statute cases." 4 Title VII burden-shifting standards
found in McDonnellDouglas and its offspring did not apply because Congress
expressly provided an evidentiary standard in FIRREA." 5
Reaching a similar result in Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v.
Herman,"6 the Eleventh Circuit refused to accept the Secretary of Labor's
argument that the framework should apply to the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974. 17 The case involved the transfer and demotion of a worker in the nuclear
construction industry."' After the employee reported a hazardous work practice,
the employer demoted the employee from second lead foreman to foreman and
transferred him to duties outside reactor construction." 9
Observing that Congress intended to place a tough standard on contractors
in the nuclear industry, the court ruled that Congress amended these
whistleblower statutes to include an evidentiary standard to battle the common
practice of "whistleblower harassment" at nuclear facilities. 20 Therefore, the
court reasoned that McDonnell Douglasand its "innumerable progeny" did not
effect the Employee Protection provisions of the Nuclear Whistleblower
2
Protection Act.' '

111. See id. at 1204-08.
112. 17 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946 (1994).
113. Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F. Supp. 1191, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
114. See id. at 1208. The two prong test included:
(1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing
that his or her disclosures were a contributing factor in adverse employment
actions; then (2) the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate by the high standard of clear and convincing evidence that it
would have made the same employment decision in the absence of the
plaintiff's disclosures.
Id.
115. Seeid.
116. 115 F.3d 1568 (11th Cir. 1997).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1994). See Herman, 115 F.3d at 1572.
118. See Herman, 115 F.3d at 1568-69.
119. See id. at 1570.
120. Id. at 1572.
121. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir.
1997). See 42 U.S.C. §5851 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/6
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C. The CircuitSplit
The Seventh Circuit in Latimore is the most recent court to consider the
disparate treatment standard in credit discrimination cases. Unfortunately, its
decision is at odds with the two other circuits who have commented on the
application of McDonnellDouglas in this context. The Supreme Court is silent
to date on this issue.
The first case in the Eighth Circuit that applied the McDonnell Douglas
framework is factually distinguishable from Latimore, but acts as a conceptual
guidepost for the framework's extension into credit discrimination law. In
UnitedStates v. Badgett,' 2the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) brought an action before an administrative law judge, charging the
defendants with discrimination based on family status. 23 Defendant Badgett
owned and operated the 156 unit Georgetown Apartments in Little Rock,
Arkansas.'24 The owner "had an explicit policy which excluded families with
children" from this adult complex. 25 The victim, Donna Mayeaux and her
daughter, inquired about residing at Georgetown, but Brittain, Badgett's agent,
discouraged the victim through statements which, by the defendant's admission,
26
were intended to deter her from renting an apartment because of her child.1
Following these statements, Mayeaux complained to HUD.1 27 Her complaint
resulted in an action.'28 The Eighth Circuit discussing the evidentiary standard,
applied the McDonnellDouglas framework.129 Citing precedent, the court gave

deference to HUD's application of the framework to cases under the FHA
because of the difficulty in establishing direct proof of discrimination. 3 0
In Ring v. FirstInterstateMortgage, Inc.,' the court indicated that the
McDonnell Douglas standard is appropriate in FHA cases where no direct
evidence of discrimination is available. 32 The court pointed out that the
framework is flexible and "varies depending upon the facts of the particular

122. 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992).
123. See id. at 1178.
124. See id. at 1177.
125. Id.

126. See id. at 1178. Brittain made statements to the effect: "[T]he complex has
no playground equipment, and no other children of the same age, so her daughter would
have no playmates." Id. Furthermore Brittain refused to show Mayeaux a one bedroom
apartment. Id.

127. United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir. 1992).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. (citing HUD v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1990)).

131. 984 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1993).
132. See id. at 926-27. The Eighth Circuit decided the case on other grounds.
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case" because the "requirement was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized or
ritualistic."" 33
The Fifth Circuit first issued an opinion on the prima facie case for credit
discrimination in Moore v. United States Departmentof.Agriculture on Behalf
of FarmersHome Administration.'34 Although the court decided the case on
other grounds, it indicated in dicta that the framework is appropriate where no
direct evidence of discrimination is available to the plaintiff.'35 Similar to the
Eighth Circuit's approach in Ring, the court limited "mechanical" application of
the framework and pointed out that "'[i]n the rare situation in which the evidence
establishes that a[] [defendant] openly discriminate[d] against an individual it is
not necessary to apply the mechanical formula of McDonnell Douglas to
establish an inference of discrimination."" 3 6
Recently, in Simms v. FirstGibraltarBank,'37 the Fifth Circuit again had
cause to review the evidentiary standard for credit discrimination cases. In a
complex set of facts, plaintiff Simms complained against the bank for its failure
to provide supplemental financing for the transition of Simms' apartment
3
complex to a cooperative housing project in a predominantly minority area.1 1
39
Simms did not pursue the cause under a "redlining" theory,' but rather alleged
that the bank engaged in discrimination under the FHA by refusing to lend to a
co-op that "would be minority-owned."' 40 The primary issue was whether
Simms presented a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA."
Squarely applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court held that
Simms failed to establish sufficient evidence of the framework's third prong in
that he offered no proof of poor minority lending habits or "racial bias" on the
part of bank employees.'
Simms could not prove that similarly situated
applicants were treated differently than he was.' 43
The result is two circuits, the Fifth and Eighth, who willingly apply the
McDonnell Douglas framework to credit discrimination cases. The Seventh

133. Id. at 927 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 358 (1977); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
715 (1983)).
134. 55 F.3d 991 (5th Cir. 1995).
135. See id. at 995.
136. Id. (quoting Kendall v. Block, 821 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1987)).
137. 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1041 (1996).
138. See id. at 1548-51.
139. For an explanation of redlining, see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text.
140. Simms, 83 F.3d at 1551.
141. See id. at 1554.
142. See Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1558 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1041 (1996). It is interesting to note that Simms, a white man, passed the first
prong on the backs of his minority tenants.
143. See id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/6
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Circuit in Latimore, however, took a distinctly different approach, refusing to
apply the framework where the facts failed to support its use.
D. Alternative Frameworksfor a Prima Facie Credit
DiscriminationCase
In addition to disparate treatment, plaintiffs can prove their case through
two other methods. All three methods are byproducts of employment
discrimination jurisprudence under Title VII.'" The alternative methods include
establishing "direct evidence of discrimination" and "the 'effects test' or
disparate impact analysis; or the disparate treatment analysis."1 45
Offering "explicit and unambiguous statements of hostility" towards an
ECOA-shielded individual is adequate to establish "discrimination without
inference or presumption."' 46 Rare is the case where direct evidence of this kind
Given lenders' sophistication and the general social
is available. 47
inappropriateness of racial language, plaintiffs are hard pressed to use this
method.1 4 ' However, at least one commentator takes the position that "[w]hile
direct evidence of discrimination may be relatively rare in employment
it provides the basis for a substantial number of claims
discrimination 1cases,
49
under ECOA."'

Absent lenders overtly discriminating against potential borrowers, the
outcome of seemingly legitimate policies may still have a negative impact on
protected class members. 150 The invidiousness of this impact has pushed

144. See Charlotte E. Thomas, Defending a Free Standing Equal Credit
OpportunityAct Claim, 114 BANKING L.J. 108, 109 (1997).
145. Id.

146. Id. (citing Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861-62 (5th
Cir. 1993); Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1990); EEOC v.
Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920,923 (11th Cir. 1990); de la Cruz v. New York City
Human Resources Dep't, 884 F. Supp. 112,116 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 82 F.3d 16 (2d
Cir. 1996),petitionfor cert.filed, (July 10, 1996) (No. 96-5214)).
147. See Schwemm, supra note 34, at 328.
148. See Schwemm, supra note 34, at 328.
149. Thomas, supra note 144, at 110. See also Moore v. United States Dep't of
Agric. on Behalf of Farmers Home Admin., 55 F.3d at 995 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[N]o whites
can qualify."); Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1084 (5th
Cir.), reh'ggranted, 812 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted,vacated, 492 U.S. 901
(1989) (holding that ECOA does not prohibit discrimination based on alienage) (clerk
told applicant that the bank "did not issue credit cards to non-citizens"); McKenzie v.
United States Home Corp., 704 F.2d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 1983) (finalized divorce
proceedings or deed of trust signed by husband as requirement for lending to woman);
Ricci v. Key Bancshares, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1132, 1140 (D. Me. 1987) (statements that
national origin was a basis for different treatment).
150. Stephen Carpenter, Farm Service Agency Credit Programs and USDA
NationalAppeals Division, 3 DRAKE . AGRIC. L. 35, 57-58 (1998).
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Congress and the Federal Reserve Board to establish the disparate impact

standard for proving an ECOA claim.' 5' This test, sounding in employment
discrimination law, is a burden-shifting approach. 52 In the employment context,
the plaintiff must show that an employment practice, facially fair or neutral,
excludes protected class members in its application.'53 Once the plaintiff meets
this burden, the burden shifts 154 and the employer must demonstrate that his
alleged discriminatory practice enjoys "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question" or is a "business necessity."' 55 Finally, "[i]f the
employer succeeds with its burden at the second stage, the employee must then
show there are other
reasonable alternatives that would result in a diminished
156
disparate impact.'

Obviously, the test is modified to meet the credit context and seems to fit
all forms of consumer credit. 57 In practice, however, the stratagem is probably
best suited to credit scoring systems which lend themselves to statistical
158
analysis.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Writing for a three judge panel, Judge Posner began his analysis with a brief
review of how plaintiffs establish a prima facie discrimination case based on the
McDonnellDouglas standard.'59 In an employment discrimination context, the
court established that plaintiffs must show that they belong to a minority group,
that they are qualified for the position, and that the employer rejected them.'6
If a plaintiff meets this burden, the shifting discriminatory presumption requires
that the defendant show "a noninvidious reason" for not hiring the plaintiff.'6'
The parties' invitation to use the McDonnellDouglasframework was no surprise

151. Thomas, supranote 144, at 110 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994); Equal Credit
Opportunity, Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1998)).
152. Gwen A. Ashton, The Equal Credit OpportunityAct From a Civil Rights
Perspective: The DisparateImpact Standard,17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 465, 474-75
(1998) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
153. See id.

154. See id.
155. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (citing
McDonnellDouglas,711 U.S. at 802).
156. Id. at 475 (quoting Jenkins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1399, 1423
(N.D. Iowa 1995)).
157. See Thomas, supra note 144, at 111.
158. See Thomas, supra note 144, at 111.
159. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713-14 (7th Cir.
1998).
160. See id.

161. Id.
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to the court because the presumption had been extended far beyond the labor
discrimination field in other decisions. 62
Next, the court turned its attention to other circuits that had adopted the
McDonnell Douglas standard. Questioning those courts' reasoning, Judge
Posner indicated that they failed to sufficiently explore the reasoning behind the
standard before "wholesale transport[ing]... [it] to the credit discrimination
context.' ' 63 He noted that a reason must exist for shifting the burden from the
plaintiff to the defendant.'" The plaintiff's difficulty in excavating the "essential
evidence" that a defendant may hold is an insufficient justification for displacing
the burden of production. 65 Noting that this displacement would create a system
of pre-complaint discovery, Judge Posner declared that the plaintiff must show
"some ground for suspecting that the defendant... violated the plaintiff's rights"
before shifting the burden to the defendant.'"
Furthering the analysis, Judge Posner compared and contrasted the
employment and credit discrimination contexts. He first noted that in the
employment discrimination context, the competitive face-off between the two
races "creates the (minimal) suspicion" that discrimination has occurred. 67 He
maintained this was not the case in the lending scenario." Judge Posner pointed
out that Latimore did not respond to an offer of a fifty-one thousand dollar loan
to be given to the most qualified applicant. 69 In fact, if she had applied in a
competitive situation and was qualified, McDonnell Douglas may have
applied. 70 Citing Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, he observed
that McDonnellDouglaswas unsuitable in situations where no basis existed for

treatment of the plaintiff with that of other similarly
comparing the defendant's
71
situated persons.'

Turning his attention to Citibank's argument, Judge Posner noted the
standard which the bank could impose on borrowers.' Comparing the standard
to the qualification prong in the employment discrimination context, he pointed
out that borrowers must meet "the lender's
173requirements for collateral as well as
... establish personal creditworthiness."
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id.
Id. at 714.
See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1998).
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1998).
See id.
See id. (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715 (1983); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13
(1973); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1997)).
172. See id.
(citing Coco v. Elmwood Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179-80 (7th Cir.
173. Id.
1997)).
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Returning to Latimore's variant of the McDonnell Douglas framework,
Judge Posner demonstrated the flaws in her reasoning. 74 Her test could not
stand in the face of normal lending requirements. 75 The court stated that the
collateral failed to meet the seventy-five percent loan-to-value ratio that is
common practice in mortgage lending. 76 The court found "nothing remotely
suspicious" about this industry-wide practice." Further, the court observed that
appraisal discrepancies were normal and that banks rarely relied on third-party
appraisers. 78 In short, the court's
discrimination suspicions were not aroused by
179
Citibank's appraisal practices.
Departing from the McDonnell Douglasframework, the court entertained
the proposition that Latimore could have attempted a conventional showing of
discrimination "without relying on any special doctrines of burden-shifting."' 80
In response to Latimore's first argument that Citibank's appraisal method was
discriminatory, Judge Posner cited the plaintiff s own expert who appraised her
property at sixty-two thousand dollars-a figure at which only forty-six thousand
dollars would be loaned using the property as collateral, not the fifty-one
thousand dollars requested from Citibank.' Pointing out that "[r]eal estate
appraisal is not an exact science" and that Citibank may use conservative
methods to contain interest rates, Judge Posner ruled out any invidious schemes
surrounding this argument."
The second prong of Latimore's conventional attack also met with disfavor
by the court. Alleging favoritism toward white loan applicants, Latimore
contended that Lundberg, the bank's loan officer, went beyond her normal duties
to assist white borrowers in meeting appraisal standards.' 83 The court rebuffed
this contention because the "favoritism" allegedly shown was in the form of
suggesting that additional "comparables" be brought to the appraisal review

174. Latirnore asked the court to apply the presumption "that her house was in a
minority neighborhood, [that] an appraisal estimated the value of the house to be at least
as great as the loan, [she] was creditworthy, [and] yet the loan was rejected." Id. at 715.
175. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1998).
Latimore's test required that "her house was in a minority neighborhood, an appraisal
estimated the value of the house to be at least as great as the loan, she was creditworthy,
and the loan was rejected." Id. at 714-15.
176. See id. at 715.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurson, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); Wallace v. SMC
Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1399 (7th Cir. 1997); Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., 841 F.2d 1533; 1539 (11th Cir. 1988)).
181. See id. at 715.
182. Id.
183. See id.
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department's attention.'
The court found this encouragement unnecessary
because Latimore herself offered additional comparables in the form of her thirdparty appraisal." 5 Hence, the court determined that Lundberg, by inquiring
about the higher appraisal, did for Latimore what she would do for any potential

borrower. 86
The final prong of the plaintiff's conventional attack challenged the
disappearance of the appraiser's notes."8 7 Federal regulations require retention
of these notes for twenty-five months after a lender denies a loan application.188
In Latimore's case, these notes were lost during the regulated period." 9 While
the court agreed that the presumption of adverse evidence is normally created by
this loss, Citibank sufficiently explained the loss as inadvertent, and thus
prevented the presumption from attaching." 0
Affirming summary judgment for Citibank, the court reflected on the
evidence as favorably as the record permitted. 191 However, the court found that
"no reasonable jury could find that [Latimore] was turned down because of her
race." 92 The court held that the McDonnell Douglas framework is unsuitable
for credit discrimination cases because there is "no basis for comparing the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff with the defendant's treatment of other,
similarly situated persons."'93

184. Id.
185. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 716. Latimore named the appraiser, Kembauer, as a defendant in
the case. Id.
188. Id. (citing Equal Credit Opportunity, Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(b)(1)(i)
(1998)).
189. See id.
190. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1998)
(citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.12(b)(1)(i), .14(c) (1998); Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d 1235, 1239
(8th Cir. 1994); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1418-19 (10th Cir. 1987);
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 695 F.2d 253, 258-59 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
191. See id. at 716.
192. Id. The court chastised both the plaintiff and her counsel for joining
Citibank's appraiser as a defendant. See id. The court sternly declared that no evidence
supported the contention that this defendant in anyway discriminated in his appraisals.
See id. In fact, the court found that of sixty-nine minority owned properties appraised,
only three-including Latimore's-failed to qualify for the loans. See id. However,
since Citibank did not ask for sanctions, the court only warned the plaintiff as to her
conduct. See id.
193. Id. at 714.
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V. COMMENT

Judge Posner is, in effect, the first federal appellate judge to critically
examine the framework as applied in the credit discrimination context. 4 In both
the Fifth and Eighth Circuit decisions, the courts ritualistically applied the
McDonnellDouglas framework without pausing to establish reasons for doing
so.' 95 The courts appeared to assume that where no direct evidence of
discrimination was available, the framework must apply.
Two possible explanations for the blanket acceptance of the framework
instantly surface. First, courts may simply be giving deference to HUD's
application of the standard in FHA cases. 6 Second, courts may feel that
Congress intends for the Title VII employment discrimination standards to apply
to disparate treatmentcredit discrimination cases just as it intended for Title VII
to apply in disparate impact credit discrimination cases. 97 Unfortunately, while
Congress explicitly adopted the Griggs standard for disparate impact cases, it has
not done so for disparate treatment cases under McDonnell Douglas. 9'
Courts that refuse to apply the framework generally do so in three
circumstances.' 99 First, courts do not substitute McDonnell Douglas for a
legislatively directed method.2" Second, the framework is not appropriate when
the parties are not similarly situated. 20 ' Finally, the framework will not apply
when plaintiffs have direct proof of discrimination or can prove discrimination
under another evidentiary standard.0 2
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits' application of the framework in each
instance is on a case-by-case basis where the facts allow. 2 3 The Seventh

194. Compare Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Savings Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir.
1998), with Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 610 (1996), andRing v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1993).
195. See generallySimms, 83 F.3d at 1546; Ring, 984 F.2d at 924.
196. Ring, 984 F.2d at 926 n.2.
197. See, e.g., Simms, 83 F.3d at 1556 (applying standards from Title VII
employment discrimination cases to disparate treatment credit discrimination under the
Fair Housing Act).
198. H.R. 6516, 94th Cong. (1975).
199. See supra notes 69-121 and accompanying text.
200. See generally Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568 (11 th
Cir. 1997); Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Iowa 1994); Jordan
v. Clay's Rest Home, 483 S.E.2d 303 (Va. 1997).
201. See generally Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir.

1998).
202. See generally Lauer Farms, Inc. v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 986
F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
203. See generally Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 927 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("McDonnell Douglas... analysis varies depending upon the facts or the
particular case- thus there is no 'inflexible formulation' that can be defined at the
pleading stage of the lawsuit.").
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Circuit's opinion leaves some room to apply McDonnell Douglas where
similarly situated non-minority loan applicants are available for comparison. 2 4
Judge Posner did not expressly foreclose the possibility of using the standard; he
merely refused to apply it in Latimore.0 5 What is unclear is whether the Seventh
Circuit will reject all disparate treatment credit discrimination claims under this
evidentiary standard or if the facts of Ms. Latimore's case were merely
insufficient to warrant its application.2°
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits instinctively accepted burden-shifting in
credit discrimination cases. Both circuits regarded burden-shifting as
appropriate when the defendant's evidence was difficult to discover and
discrimination was hard to prove. 0 7 In Latimore,the Seventh Circuit critically
questioned burden-shifting in such cases. 208 Judge Posner writes:
There has to be a reason for shifting the burden to the defendant. It is
not reason enough that essential evidence is in the defendant's
possession and would be difficult for the plaintiff.., to dig out of the
defendant .... Before the defendant may be put to the burden of
producing evidence, the plaintiff has to show that there is some ground
for suspecting
that the defendant has indeed violated the plaintiffs
20 9
rights.

Unfortunately, this statement flies in face of the purpose behind the McDonnell
Douglas framework. The purpose behind the framework is to allow plaintiffs
to show discrimination in cases where they lack sufficient access to evidence in

204. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713-16.
205. Seeid. at716.
206. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713-14 (7th Cir.
1998). Judge Posner cites Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden ofProof,72 IND. L.J. 651

(1997), which questions the validity of burden-shifting regimens in the adversarial
system.
207. See Moore v. United States Dep't of Agric. on Behalf of Farmers Home
Admin., 55 F.3d. 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1995) ("In the rare situation in which the evidence
establishes that an employer openly discriminates against an individual it is not necessary
to apply... McDonnell Douglas to establish an inference of discrimination."); United
States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The McDonnellDouglas test

recognizes that direct proof of unlawful discrimination is rarely available. Therefore,
after a plaintiff makes a prima facie case, a presumption of illegality arises and
respondent has the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification
208. Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714. The burden-shifting conflict in Latimore,without

question, is the most difficult portion of the decision to reconcile with other federal
appellate courts. A study of burden shifting is, obviously, beyond the scope of this Note,

but needless to say Judge Posner's statements certainly muddy the waters of many
burden-shifting doctrines in the Seventh Circuit.
209. Id.
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the defendant's possession." ' Given plaintiffs' protected status, discrimination
is presumed.21 1 Further, the burden shifted to the defendant is "exceedingly
light." 212 The proposition that the defending lending institution's counsel cannot
offer a defensible explanation for disapproving the application defies reality. As
Judge Chin pointed out, "clever men may easily conceal their motivations. 21 3
Beyond simply avoiding the issue and using an alternative method for
proving a discrimination case as noted above, 214 this Author offers two potential
solutions to resolve the split of authority: one solution comes from outside the
judiciary and the other comes from within. First, Congress, or in its stead the
Federal Reserve, should offer legislation or regulations directing the burden of
proof in disparate treatment cases just as they have done in Regulation B for
disparate impact situations.1 5 Congress and the Federal Reserve are well
equipped to conduct the type of study and analysis required to consider the
impact of FHA and ECOA credit discrimination prohibitions from their
inception. Further, they are the most capable of forming policies that would
address lingering problems yet to be resolved.
Second, the Supreme Court, in the face of congressional or executive
inaction, should review a disparate treatment credit discrimination case. An
appropriate finding would be to shoot the gap in the circuit split and to allow the
McDonnell Douglas framework to apply where the facts support its use and
similarly situated parties are available for comparison. However, the Court
should not "jam" every possible credit discrimination case into this mold when
all cases simply will not fit.

VI. CONCLUSION
Even the optimist would agree that while credit discrimination may be
unintentional, it pervades all types of lending. Statistics show that home lending
discrimination is widespread. However, the statistics fail to show the effects of
the discrimination. Unequal access to credit prevents minority individuals from
realizing many of the fruits of liberty-home ownership, education, and business
ownership. Until Congress or the Supreme Court acts to clarify standards under

210. Lapsley v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians &Surgeons, 999 F. Supp.
506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). "As originally conceived, the McDonnell Douglasformula
was intended 'progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination."' Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 n.8 (1981)).
211. See Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514-16.
212. Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330, 1134 (11th Cir. 1994).
213. Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 516 (quoting Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610
F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)).
214. See supra Section III.
215. See Equal Credit Opportunity, Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1998).
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statutes such as the FHA and ECOA, many potential minority borrowers will
continue to face the unsurmountable wall-full functional membership in

American society.
RIcHARD A. HILL
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